Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47001
Authors: 
Stähler, Frank
Year of Publication: 
1992
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 542
Abstract: 
This paper questions the standard results of an international noncooperative reduction game through considering scope effects between reduction and adaptation policies. In particular, it demonstrates that scope effects can result in positively sloped reaction curves. The paper discusses also the role of different conjectures and corner solutions. It concludes that, compared to the well-known standard results, all these effects introduce a good deal of ambiguity surrounding any forecast which is based on purely theoretical grounds.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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