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**MANAGING GLOBAL POLLUTION PROBLEMS
BY REDUCTION AND ADAPTATION POLICIES**

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Abstract: This paper questions the standard results of an international non-cooperative reduction game through considering scope effects between reduction and adaptation policies. In particular, it demonstrates that scope effects can result in positively sloped reaction curves. The paper discusses also the role of different conjectures and corner solutions. It concludes that, compared to the well-known standard results, all these effects introduce a good deal of ambiguity surrounding any forecast which is based on purely theoretical grounds.

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1. Introduction

The challenge of international environmental policy is gaining steadily more attention because an increasing number of pollution problems does not fit into the scope of mere national treatment. Obviously, global problems like depleting the ozone layer, heating-up the atmosphere by emitting greenhouse gases and destroying biospheres demand international cooperation. However, international cooperation faces a lot of obstacles which originate at least from the sovereignty of countries. Sovereign countries cannot credibly commit to an agreement which is not self-enforcing. Self-enforcing agreements ensure that every country is always at least not worse off by sticking to the agreement than by breaching it.

Although the feature of infinite repetition can reconcile international environmental cooperation and self-enforcement, a lot of global problems are still on the international policy agenda. Infinite repetition can do its stabilizing job only if governments feel not only responsible for short terms. The results of the Earth Summit have revealed that such a workable cooperation is hard to emerge (Heister, Klepper, Stähler (1992)). Thus, this paper considers international environmental policy still as a non-cooperative issue. It assumes that two countries i and j use a global international environmental resource by emitting pollutants.

However, I will enlarge the analysis of this static non-cooperative game by two aspects which the literature has neglected so far.¹ First, a country is not only able to improve the environmental quality by reducing emissions but also by adapting to changed environmental conditions. Most of the economic literature implicitly assumes reduction and adaptation to be strictly separable. On the contrary, I will assume that positive economies of scope exist between reduction and adaptation policies.

Second, managing environmental deterioration by adaptation policies can itself result in externalities for the other countries. Hence, I will add externality effects to the standard effects of adaptation policies. In doing so, I do not merely add an unchangeable suffer or benefit for either country because a country can modify the degree of externalities it suffers or enjoys by changing its reduction efforts which influence the adaptation policy of the other country through the scope effect.

¹ For a discussion of international environmental problems see e.g. Barrett (1989), Carraro, Siniscalco (1991) and Welsch (1992).

This paper will question the standard results of an international non-cooperative reduction game. Scope effects and externalities are apt to modify these results essentially. Thus, the resulting ambiguity surrounding any theoretical forecast even in these static scenarios demands a careful investigation of the crucial parameters. The paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents a model of interdependent reduction and adaptation policies. Chapter 3 compares the non-cooperative with the cooperative outcome, considers the slope of the reaction curves and discusses the role of different conjectures. Chapter 4 deals with corner solutions in the non-cooperative setting because sufficiently strong scope effects are able to render the second-order-conditions non-fulfilled. Chapter 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.

2. A Model of Reduction and Adaptation Policies

Modelling interdependent reduction and adaptation policies means enlarging the standard static approach of global pollution problems. Let q_i (q_j) and x_i (x_j) denote the reduction efforts and adaptational investments of country i (j). For the sake of simplicity, quadratic functions will represent costs and benefits:

(1)

$$B_i = \alpha_i Q - \beta_i/2 Q^2 + \gamma_i x_i - \delta_i/2 x_i^2 + \varepsilon_i Q x_i - \omega_i x_j$$

$$B_j = \alpha_j Q - \beta_j/2 Q^2 + \gamma_j x_j - \delta_j/2 x_j^2 + \varepsilon_j Q x_j - \omega_j x_i$$

$$\alpha_i, \beta_i, \gamma_i, \delta_i, \varepsilon_i, \alpha_j, \beta_j, \gamma_j, \delta_j, \varepsilon_j > 0, Q = q_i + q_j < \min \{ \beta_i/\alpha_i, \beta_j/\alpha_j \},$$

$$q_i, q_j > 0, x_i < \delta_i/c_i, x_j < \delta_j/c_j$$

Total benefits consist of benefits which originate from the degree of *total* reductions, of benefits which originate from the degree of *national* adaptational investments, of the beneficial scope effects and of the externality effect. Scope and externality effects enter the benefit functions lineary which will simplify the discussion of conjectures and second-order-conditions in the following chapters significantly. Restricting the relevant ranges of Q , of x_i and of x_j ensures that the first derivatives are positive. $\varepsilon_i = \partial^2 B_i / \partial Q \partial x_i$ and $\varepsilon_j = \partial^2 B_j / \partial Q \partial x_j$ represent the scope effects and indicate the positive marginal change of the marginal benefits of reductions (adaptations) by a change of adaptations (reductions).

Several specific policy options fit into the logic of scope effects. E.g., consider a country which faces the risks of droughts because the release of greenhouse gases heats the atmosphere up. Besides reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the country can opt to install an irrigation infrastructure in order to mitigate harvest losses. In this case, an increase in greenhouse gas reductions can improve the marginal productivity of irrigation measures because lower global change risks improve the insurance against famines which is provided by irrigation. Alternatively, adaptation can entail incentives to emigrate in order to preserve a certain living standard for the remaining population. This actual danger which troubles many politicians in industrialized countries can originate from adaptation policies because a decrease or non-increase of the domestic population can improve the success of reduction policies.

Both examples shed also some light on the externality effects of adaptation policies which are indicated by the sign of ω . The pressure of immigration illustrates most dramatically the seemingly harmful effect of adaptations. Erecting an irrigation infrastructure can represent a negative externality, too, because it can shorten the water availability in the other country significantly. Both effects confirm that managing specific pollution issues merely transfers the pollution problem to another agent (Bird (1987)). However, also positive externalities are conceivable. E.g., erecting dykes and dams to protect lowland against a rising sea level can also protect the lowland of the other country behind.

Reductions and adaptations incur costs which are given by

$$(2) \quad C_i = \theta_i/2 q_i^2 \quad C_j = \theta_j/2 q_j^2$$

$$\theta_i, \theta_j > 0$$

and

$$(3) \quad D_i = \kappa_i/2 x_i^2 \quad D_j = \kappa_j/2 x_j^2$$

$$\kappa_i, \kappa_j > 0$$

The basic structure of this model implies that country i (j) is not helpless in influencing the degree of externalities which are lineary dependent on the adaptation policy of j (i). Any variation of i 's (j 's) reduction efforts changes the adaptation policy of j (i) through the economies of scope. Hence, a country fearing substantial negative externalities can

mitigate these effects by changing its own reduction plans. The next chapter will take these effects into account when different conjectures are considered.

3. Cooperative and Non-Cooperative International Policies

This chapter assumes that the sufficient second-order-conditions are fulfilled for the cooperative and non-cooperative solution. The appendix deals with these conditions explicitly and the following chapter will pick up corner solutions. Let U denote the sum of the net benefits of both countries. If a cooperative agreement assigns equal weights to each country's net benefits, the maximization of U with respect to the four instrument variables indicates the optimal cooperative solution:

(4)

$$(\alpha_i + \alpha_j) - (\beta_i + \beta_j)(q_i + q_j) + \varepsilon_i x_i + \varepsilon_j x_j - \theta_i q_i = 0$$

$$\gamma_i - \delta_i x_i + \varepsilon_i (q_i + q_j) - \omega_j - \kappa_i x_i = 0$$

$$(\alpha_i + \alpha_j) - (\beta_i + \beta_j)(q_i + q_j) + \varepsilon_i x_i + \varepsilon_j x_j - \theta_j q_j = 0$$

$$\gamma_j - \delta_j x_j + \varepsilon_j (q_i + q_j) - \omega_i - \kappa_j x_j = 0$$

The lack of a cooperative agreement induces every country to take only the effects of its own policy instruments on its own net benefits into account. Chapter 2 has already mentioned that the reduction policy can vary the degree of externalities. Without going into detail now, let (5) represent the conjectures of i and j with respect to a change of x_j and x_i by a change of q_i and q_j , respectively:

$$(5) \quad \begin{aligned} x_j' &= \Omega_i(q_i), & \frac{d\Omega_i}{dq_i} &= \text{const.} \geq 0 \\ x_i' &= \Omega_j(q_j), & \frac{d\Omega_j}{dq_j} &= \text{const.} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Hence, the first-order-conditions for i and j are

(6)

$$\alpha_i - (\beta_i + \theta_i) q_i - \beta_i q_j + \varepsilon_i x_i + \omega_i \frac{d\Omega_i}{dq_i} = 0$$

$$\gamma_i - (\delta_i + \kappa_i) x_i - \varepsilon_i (q_i + q_j) = 0$$

$$\alpha_j - (\beta_j + \theta_j) q_j - \beta_j q_i + \varepsilon_j x_j + \omega_j \frac{d\Omega_j}{dq_j} = 0$$

$$\gamma_j - (\delta_j + \kappa_j) x_j - \varepsilon_j (q_i + q_j) = 0$$

In the case of mutual negative externalities, comparing (6) and (4) indicates that foregone benefits due to neglecting the harmful impacts of one country's adaptation policies on the other country supplement the foregone benefits due to non-cooperative reduction policies. According to (7),

$$(7) \quad x_i = \frac{\gamma_i + \varepsilon_i (q_i + q_j)}{\delta_i + \kappa_i} \quad x_j = \frac{\gamma_j + \varepsilon_j (q_i + q_j)}{\delta_j + \kappa_j}$$

the adaptation policy is solely dependent on the reduction policies. Inserting (7) into the first and third line of (6) gives the reaction curves of i and j:

(8)

$$R(q_i) = \frac{\alpha_i(\delta_i + \kappa_i) + \varepsilon_i \gamma_i + [\varepsilon_i^2 - \beta_i(\delta_i + \kappa_i)]q_j - \omega_i d\Omega_i/dq_i(\delta_i + \kappa_i)}{|H_i|}$$

$$R(q_j) = \frac{\alpha_j(\delta_j + \kappa_j) + \varepsilon_j \gamma_j + [\varepsilon_j^2 - \beta_j(\delta_j + \kappa_j)]q_i - \omega_j d\Omega_j/dq_j(\delta_j + \kappa_j)}{|H_j|}$$

$|H_k| = (\beta_k + \theta_k)(\delta_k + \kappa_k) - \varepsilon_k^2$, $k = i, j$, denotes the determinant of the Hessian which must be positive to fulfill the second-order-conditions.² Both reaction curves have a linear slope:

² A positive $|H_k|$ guarantees a global maximum which may be a too strict condition. However, a local optimum demands only a non-negative $|H_k|$ which

$$(9) \quad \frac{dR(q_i)}{dq_j} = -1 + \frac{\theta_i (\delta_i + \kappa_i)}{|H_i|} \equiv \Phi_i > -1$$

$$\frac{dR(q_j)}{dq_i} = -1 + \frac{\theta_j (\delta_j + \kappa_j)}{|H_j|} \equiv \Phi_j > -1$$

Interestingly, there exists a range of positive ε_i 's and ε_j 's which implies positively sloped reaction curves while leaving $|H_i|$ and $|H_j|$ still positive. The condition for the determinant of the Hessians and (9) identify this range as

$$(10) \quad \sqrt{\beta_i (\delta_i + \kappa_i)} < \varepsilon_i < \sqrt{(\beta_i + \theta_i) (\delta_i + \kappa_i)}$$

$$\sqrt{\beta_j (\delta_j + \kappa_j)} < \varepsilon_j < \sqrt{(\beta_j + \theta_j) (\delta_j + \kappa_j)}$$

The higher the second derivatives of the reduction cost functions, i.e. θ_i and θ_j , are the larger is the range of ε_i and ε_j which fulfill (10). However, large θ s do not imply a steep inclination of the reaction curve because they dominate the numerator and the denominator of the quotients in (9). These quotients approach 1 as θ increases which results in a negligibly positive slope.

Thus, a sufficiently strong scope effect is able to initiate positive reactions. In such a case, if country i (j) increases its reduction efforts, country j (i) will react by increasing its reduction efforts, too, because the change in benefits via the scope term is so strong that own reduction efforts must be increased to balance the cost-weighted marginal benefits of reductions and adaptations. This effect deserves careful attention because the positive reaction does not originate from signalling strategies or even tacit agreements. Positive reactions originate from non-cooperative maximization. An increase of q_j increases the marginal productivity of x_i which must be compensated by an increase in q_i to maximize net benefits. A marginal balancing of x_i and q_i is necessary to adapt optimally to an external productivity shift. If this partial effect overcompensates the partial free-rider-effect, the reaction curve will be sloped upwards.

includes a zero $|H_k|$. A zero $|H_k|$ is ruled out here for reasons of better tractability.

To elaborate the equilibrium values of q_i and q_j , defining some new terms is convenient:

$$\begin{aligned}\Sigma_i &= \frac{\alpha_i (\delta_i - \kappa_i) + \varepsilon_i \gamma_i}{|H_i|} & \Sigma_j &= \frac{\alpha_j (\delta_j - \kappa_j) + \varepsilon_j \gamma_j}{|H_j|} \\ T_i &= \omega_i (\delta_i + \kappa_i) & T_j &= \omega_j (\delta_j + \kappa_j)\end{aligned}$$

This model assumes that Σ_i and Σ_j are non-negative because negative reductions do not make sense even for zero reductions of the other country. Inserting these terms into (8) and solving for the equilibrium values gives

$$(11) \quad \begin{aligned}q_i^* &= \frac{\Sigma_i + \Phi_i \Sigma_j - \Phi_i T_j d\Omega_j/dq_j - T_i d\Omega_i/dq_i}{1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j} \\ q_j^* &= \frac{\Sigma_j + \Phi_j \Sigma_i - \Phi_j T_i d\Omega_i/dq_i - T_j d\Omega_j/dq_j}{1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j}\end{aligned}$$

(11) assumes that a unique Nash solution always exists, i.e. that the equation system is non-singular. The standard assumption of non-cooperative game theory, i.e. $\Phi_i \Phi_j < 1$, meets this condition.

I now introduce three different types of conjectures concerning the abilities of a country to assess the influence of own reduction policies on the degree of externalities. They reflect different degrees of a country's "policy sophistication":

- The case of *ignorance* supposes no influence on the externalities:

$$(C1) \quad \frac{d\Omega_k}{dq_k} = 0, \quad k \in \{i, j\}$$

- The case of *partial integration* recognizes that, due to (5), an increase of reductions causes an increase of externalities:

$$(C2) \quad \frac{d\Omega_i}{dq_i} = \frac{\varepsilon_j}{\delta_j + \kappa_j}, \quad \frac{d\Omega_j}{dq_j} = \frac{\varepsilon_i}{\delta_i + \kappa_i}$$

- The case of *total integration* recognizes additionally the variation of the other reduction level because an increase in q also modifies the other agent's reduction level according to (8):

$$(C3) \quad \frac{d\Omega_i}{dq_i} = \frac{\varepsilon_j}{\delta_j + \kappa_j} (1 + \Phi_j), \quad \frac{d\Omega_j}{dq_j} = \frac{\varepsilon_i}{\delta_i + \kappa_i} (1 + \Phi_i)$$

Starting with discussing the case of ignorance for both countries, it is evident that the existence of economies of scope - measured by ε_i and ε_j - unambiguously mitigates the free-rider-effect which standard models observe. The introduction of non-negative ε s increases Σ_i , Σ_j , Φ_i and Φ_j and thus the equilibrium values q_i^* and q_j^* . For the case of ignorance, this result holds independent of the signs of T_i and T_j .

Conjectures C2 and C3 change the equilibrium values dependent on the signs of T_i and T_j . Table 1 summarizes the nine possible combinations of equilibrium values.

[Table 1 about here]

The table reveals that determining the equilibrium values depends on a complex interplay among the slopes of the reaction curves, the signs of T_i and T_j and the different conjectures. Even if one concentrates on the diagonal of Table 1 because discussing other combinations needs some preliminaries concerning information asymmetries, the change of equilibrium values is by no means clear when compared to C1/C1. E.g., if both countries suffer from adaptations of each other, i.e. $T_i, T_j < 0$, the conjecture combination C2/C2 does only lead to lower equilibrium values if the slopes of the reaction curves Φ_i and Φ_j are negative. In such a case, C3/C3 is a damper on this effect.

The roles of ε_i and ε_j remain decisive for the interior solutions because they determine the slopes of the reaction curve and enter the variations which C2 and C3 induce. Hence, it should be interesting how a change in ε_i and ε_j will vary the equilibrium values q_i^* and q_j^* . This change can originate from new scientific results or from the availability of new adaptation measures which both emphasize the interdependence between reductions and adaptations. Taking ε_i as an example, differentiations (which

have been carried out in the appendix) yield mostly ambiguous results. Assuming that C1 holds for both countries, Table 2 summarizes the different combinations

[Table 2 about here]

The appendix proves that any unambiguous sign cannot be confirmed if both countries anticipate the effects of their policies according to C2 or C3. Hence, any reaction to a change in either scope term is conceivable if the agents take the effects of their policy on the degree of externalities into account.

4. Corner Solutions in the Non-Cooperative Setting

The previous chapter has ruled out corner solutions by assuming negative definiteness. However, scope effects are apt to conflict with negative definiteness. Thus, this chapter will address non-cooperative corner solutions and compare them with the cooperative outcome. Whenever this chapter will use second-order-results, the reader is referred to the appendix for details.

First observe that $d^2\Omega_k/dq_k^2 = d^2\Omega_k/dq_k dq_l = 0$ for any $k, l \in \{i, j\}$. Hence, conjectures are not relevant for the second-order-conditions *in this model*. Taking country i as an example, suppose that

$$(12) \quad (\beta_i + \theta_i) (\delta_i + \kappa_i) - \varepsilon_i^2 (= |E_2^i|) < 0$$

holds. (12) indicates that the first-order-conditions now represent a *minimum*. The scope effects are so strong that an interior solution cannot be optimal for i .

But (12) does not necessarily imply that one of the conditions of negative semi-definiteness for the cooperative solution is also violated.

$$(13) \quad (\beta_i + \beta_j + \theta_i) (\delta_i + \kappa_i) - \varepsilon_i^2 (= |D_2^1|) \geq 0$$

can still be fulfilled. A corner solution in the cooperative setting induces a corner solution in the non-cooperative setting, but not vice versa. There exists a range which

depends on β_j and in which cooperation demands reduction *and* adaptation policies but non-cooperation stipulates either policy.³ If country i concentrates on reduction policies, it sets x_i zero:

(14)

$$\max_{q_i} \{ \alpha_i (q_i + q_j) - \beta_i (q_i + q_j)^2/2 - \theta_i q_i^2/2 - \omega_i x_j \}$$

which leads to the optimal reduction level denoted by q_i^c :

$$(15) \quad q_i^c = \frac{\alpha_i - \beta_i q_j + \omega_i d\Omega_i/dq_i}{\beta_i + q_i}$$

If country i concentrates on adaptation policies, it sets q_i zero:

(16)

$$\max_{x_i} \{ \alpha_i q_j - \beta_i q_j^2/2 - \gamma_i x_i - \delta_i x_i^2/2 + \varepsilon_i q_j x_i - \omega_i x_j \}$$

which leads to the optimal adaptation level denoted by x_i^c :

$$(17) \quad x_i^c = \frac{\gamma_i - \varepsilon_i q_j}{\delta_i + k_i}$$

Thus, if (12) is valid, the solution is given by

(18)

$$q_i \in \left\{ 0, \frac{\alpha_i - \beta_i q_j + \omega_i d\Omega_i/dq_i}{\beta_i + q_i} \right\},$$

$$x_i \in \left\{ 0, \frac{\gamma_i - \varepsilon_i q_j}{\delta_i + k_i} \right\},$$

³ The functional form rules the no-policy-variant out.

$$q_i x_i = 0$$

The parameters determine the superiority of the relevant policy option. The free-rider-effect with respect to reductions indicates intuitively that a focus on adaptation is probable when (12) holds. To elaborate the concrete figure, (17) and (15) must be inserted into the benefit functions and compared with each other. No superiority of a specific policy can be confirmed on purely theoretical grounds but both optimal levels depend on q_j . It is interesting how a change in q_j changes the difference between the net benefits of an exclusive reduction and those of an exclusive adaptation policy. Define $\Delta_i(q_j) \equiv U_i(q_i^c, q_j) - U_i(x_i^c, q_j)$:

$$(19) \quad \Delta_i(q_j) = \alpha_i q_i^c - (\beta_i + \theta_i) q_i^{c2}/2 \\ - \gamma_i x_i^c + (\delta_i + \kappa_i) x_i^{c2}/2 \\ - q_j (\beta_i q_i^c + \varepsilon_i x_i^c)$$

Using (15) and (17) to determine $\partial q_i^c / \partial q_j = -\beta_i / (\beta_i + \theta_i)$ and $\partial x_i^c / \partial q_j = \varepsilon_i / (\delta_i + \kappa_i)$ gives

(20)

$$\frac{d\Delta_i}{dq_j} = - \frac{\alpha_i \beta_i}{\beta_i + \theta_i} + \beta_i q_i^c - \frac{\gamma_i \varepsilon_i}{\delta_i + \kappa_i} + \varepsilon_i x_i^c \\ - q_j \left[- \frac{\beta_i^2}{\beta_i + \theta_i} + \frac{\varepsilon_i^2}{\delta_i + \kappa_i} \right] \\ - (\beta_i q_i^c + \varepsilon_i x_i^c) = \\ - \frac{\alpha_i \beta_i}{\beta_i + \theta_i} - \frac{\gamma_i \varepsilon_i}{\delta_i + \kappa_i} - q_j \left[\frac{\varepsilon_i^2}{\delta_i + \kappa_i} - \frac{\beta_i^2}{\beta_i + \theta_i} \right]$$

The sign of $d\Delta_i/dq_j$ depends on the sign of the last term. Recall that $\varepsilon_i^2 > (\beta_i + \theta_i) (\delta_i + \kappa_i)$. Hence,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\varepsilon_i^2}{\delta_i + \kappa_i} - \frac{\beta_i^2}{\beta_i + \theta_i} &> \frac{(\beta_i + \theta_i)(\delta_i + \kappa_i)}{\delta_i + \kappa_i} - \frac{\beta_i^2}{\beta_i + \theta_i} \\ = \frac{(\beta_i + \theta_i)^2 - \beta_i^2}{\beta_i + \theta_i} &= \frac{2 \theta_i \beta_i + \theta_i^2}{\beta_i + \theta_i} > 0 \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the last term is also negative and

$$\frac{d\Delta_i}{dq_j} < 0$$

holds.⁴ This proves that, when adaptation policies are superior in the case of no reductions of j , i.e. $U_i(x_i^c, 0) > U_i(q_j^c, 0)$, they are also superior for any positive q_j . But if $U_i(x_i^c, 0) < U_i(q_j^c, 0)$, there may exist a break even-level in the relevant range of q_j . These results also prove the intuitively plain idea that concentrating on adaptive investments is relatively better the higher j 's reduction efforts are because the benefits of the scope effects can only arise in the case of adaptation policies. Table 3 summarizes the different conceivable scenarios of corner solutions.

[Table 3 about here]

This chapter has demonstrated that the chances for reduction policies are low if the second-order-conditions are not fulfilled. Assuming no reductions of the other country, one can expect an exclusive adaptation policy because it is a salient feature of most public goods problems that the *individual* marginal benefits fall short from the marginal costs. If this result holds, it also holds for any positive reductions of the other country. Therefore, very strong economies of scope induce no reductions whereas the standard

⁴ Note that the Δ_i -function is concave because

$$\frac{d^2\Delta_i}{dq_j^2} = - \left[\frac{\varepsilon_i^2}{\delta_i + \kappa_i} - \frac{\beta_i^2}{\beta_i + \theta_i} \right] < 0.$$

results which guarantee an interior solution result in too low, but still positive reduction efforts.

5. Summary and Conclusions

This paper has shown that scope and externality effects introduce a good deal of ambiguity surrounding any theoretical forecast. Scope effects can induce positively sloped reaction curves with respect to reduction efforts. They can explain the seemingly irrational "commitments" of a country to foster unilateral reductions (Hoel (1991)). When strong economies of scope exist which a country has not yet taken into account, increased reduction efforts can maximize the net benefits. Thus, these commitments can originate from an efficient strategy which exploits the dominant economies of scope.

The different conjectures shed some light on managing externalities which are due to the other country's adaptation policy. They increase the degree of ambiguity with respect to the equilibrium values significantly even if asymmetric conjecture combinations are ruled out. Different conjectures set the stage for strategic policy variants. Dropping the assumption of a one-shot-game, they can serve as a basis to enlarge the approach in order to include several stages of a repeating game. However, I doubt whether a multi-stage approach will be able to resolve ambiguity.

Strong scope effects are also able to violate the second-order-conditions. Whenever an exclusive adaptation policy is superior for zero reductions of the other country, it is always superior. Hence, scope effects can even conflict with the pessimistic standard non-cooperative results which produce too low, but still positive reduction efforts. Their strength must be carefully taken into consideration when discussing international reduction games.

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Appendix

Conditions for semi-definiteness

The Hessian for the cooperative outcome is given by

$$H = \begin{bmatrix} U_{qiqi} & U_{qiqj} & U_{qixi} & U_{qixj} \\ U_{qjqj} & U_{qjqj} & U_{qjxi} & U_{qjxj} \\ U_{xixi} & U_{xixj} & U_{xixi} & U_{xixj} \\ U_{xjxj} & U_{xjxj} & U_{xjxi} & U_{xjxj} \end{bmatrix}$$

and the second-order-conditions demand

$$U_{qiqi}, U_{qjqj}, U_{xixi}, U_{xjxj} \leq 0$$

$$|D^1_2| = U_{qiqi} U_{qjqj} - U_{qiqj}^2 \geq 0$$

$$|D^2_2| = U_{qiqi} U_{xixi} - U_{qixi}^2 \geq 0$$

$$|D^3_2| = U_{qiqi} U_{xjxj} - U_{qixj}^2 \geq 0$$

$$|D^4_2| = U_{qjqj} U_{xixi} - U_{qjxi}^2 \geq 0$$

$$|D^5_2| = U_{qjqj} U_{xjxj} - U_{qjxj}^2 \geq 0$$

$$|D^6_2| = U_{xixi} U_{xjxj} - U_{xixj}^2 \geq 0$$

$$|D^1_3| = 2 U_{qiqj} U_{qixi} U_{qjxi} - U_{qjqj} U_{qixi}^2 - U_{qiqi} U_{qixi}^2 + U_{xixi} |D^1_2| \leq 0$$

$$|D^2_3| = 2 U_{qiqj} U_{qixj} U_{qjxj} - U_{qjqj} U_{qixj}^2 - U_{qiqi} U_{qixi}^2 + U_{xjxj} |D^1_2| \leq 0$$

$$|D^3_3| = 2 U_{qixi} U_{qixj} U_{xixj} - U_{xixi} U_{qixj}^2 - U_{qiqi} U_{xixj}^2 + U_{xjxj} |D^2_2| \leq 0$$

$$|D^4_3| = 2 U_{qjxi} U_{qjxj} U_{xixj} - U_{xixi} U_{qjxj}^2 - U_{qjqj} U_{xixj}^2 + U_{xjxj} |D^4_2| \leq 0$$

$$|D^4| = |H| = (U_{qixi} U_{qjxj} - U_{qixj} U_{qjxi})^2 +$$

$$(U_{qixj} U_{xixj} - U_{qixi} U_{xixi})(U_{qiqj} U_{qjxj} - U_{qiqj} U_{qixj}) +$$

$$(U_{qjxi} U_{xixj} - U_{qjxj} U_{xixi})(U_{qiqi} U_{qjxj} - U_{qiqj} U_{qixj}) +$$

$$U_{qixj} U_{xixi} (U_{qiqj} U_{xixj} - U_{qjqj} U_{qixj}) + U_{qjxj} U_{xixj} (U_{qiqi} U_{qjxi} - U_{qjqj} U_{qixi}) -$$

$$U_{xixj}^2 |D^1_2| + U_{xixj}^2 |D^1_3| \geq 0$$

The model of the paper produces the Hessian H

$$\begin{bmatrix} -(\beta_i + \beta_j + \theta_i) & -(\beta_i + \beta_j) & \varepsilon_i & \varepsilon_j \\ -(\beta_i + \beta_j) & -(\beta_i + \beta_j + \theta_j) & \varepsilon_i & \varepsilon_j \\ \varepsilon_i & \varepsilon_i & -(\delta_i + \kappa_i) & 0 \\ \varepsilon_j & \varepsilon_j & 0 & -(\delta_j + \kappa_j) \end{bmatrix}$$

U_{qiqi} , U_{qjqj} , U_{xixi} , $U_{xjxj} \leq 0$ is always fulfilled. The other determinants are given by

$$|D^1_2| = (\beta_i + \beta_j + \theta_i)(\beta_i + \beta_j + \theta_j) - (\beta_i + \beta_j)^2 > 0$$

$$|D^2_2| = (\beta_i + \beta_j + \theta_i)(\delta_i + \kappa_i) - \varepsilon_i^2$$

$$|D^3_2| = (\beta_i + \beta_j + \theta_i)(\delta_j + \kappa_j) - \varepsilon_j^2$$

$$|D^4_2| = (\beta_i + \beta_j + \theta_j)(\delta_i + \kappa_i) - \varepsilon_i^2$$

$$|D^5_2| = (\beta_i + \beta_j + \theta_j)(\delta_j + \kappa_j) - \varepsilon_j^2$$

$$|D^6_2| = (\delta_i + \kappa_i)(\delta_j + \kappa_j) > 0$$

$$|D^1_3| = \varepsilon_i^2 \theta_j - \varepsilon_i \varepsilon_j \theta_i - (\delta_i + \kappa_i) |D^1_2|$$

$$|D^2_3| = \varepsilon_j^2 (\theta_i - \theta_j) - (\delta_j + \kappa_j) |D^1_2|$$

$$|D^3_3| = \varepsilon_j^2 (\delta_i + \kappa_i) - (\delta_j + \kappa_j) |D^2_2|$$

$$|D^4_3| = \varepsilon_j^2 (\delta_i + \kappa_i) - (\delta_j + \kappa_j) |D^4_2|$$

$$|D^4| = |H| = -\varepsilon_j^2 (\theta_i - \theta_j) (\delta_i + \kappa_i) - (\delta_j + \kappa_j) |D^1_3|$$

The second-order-conditions for the non-cooperative outcome embrace only two 2x2 matrices. Denote V as the functional which is maximized non-cooperatively:

$$V_{qiqi} = -(\beta_i + \theta_i) \leq 0$$

$$V_{xixi} = -(\delta_i + \kappa_i) \leq 0$$

$$V_{q_j q_j} = -(\beta_j + \theta_j) \leq 0$$

$$V_{x_j x_j} = -(\delta_j + \kappa_j) \leq 0$$

$$|E^i_2| = (\beta_i + \theta_i)(\delta_i + \kappa_i) - \varepsilon_i^2 \geq 0$$

$$|E^j_2| = (\beta_j + \theta_j)(\delta_j + \kappa_j) - \varepsilon_j^2 \geq 0$$

The last two determinants must be compared with $|D^2_2|$ and $|D^5_2|$, respectively, to elaborate the set of β_i and β_j which fulfill the second-order-conditions in the cooperative but not in the non-cooperative setting.

Differentiations with respect to ε_i

$$\frac{\partial q_i^*}{\partial \varepsilon_i} = \frac{\frac{\partial(\Sigma_i + \Phi_i \Sigma_j)}{\partial \varepsilon_i} (1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j) - \frac{\partial(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}{\partial \varepsilon_i} (\Sigma_i + \Phi_i \Phi_j)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)^2}$$

Disentangling the terms gives:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial(\Sigma_i + \Phi_i \Sigma_j)}{\partial \varepsilon_i} &= \frac{\gamma_i [(\beta_i + \theta_i)(\delta_i + \kappa_i) - \varepsilon_i^2] + 2\varepsilon_i [\alpha_i (\delta_i - \kappa_i) + \varepsilon_i \gamma_i]}{[(\beta_i + \theta_i)(\delta_i + \kappa_i) - \varepsilon_i^2]^2} \\ &+ \frac{2\varepsilon_i [(\beta_i + \theta_i)(\delta_i + \kappa_i) - \varepsilon_i^2] + 2\varepsilon_i [\varepsilon_i^2 - \beta_i (\delta_i + \kappa_i)]}{[(\beta_i + \theta_i)(\delta_i + \kappa_i) - \varepsilon_i^2]^2} \Sigma_j > 0 \end{aligned}$$

which is unambiguously positive,

$$\frac{\partial(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}{\partial \varepsilon_i} = -\Phi_j \frac{2\varepsilon_i [(\beta_i + \theta_i)(\delta_i + \kappa_i) - \varepsilon_i^2] + 2\varepsilon_i [\varepsilon_i^2 - \beta_i (\delta_i + \kappa_i)]}{[(\beta_i + \theta_i)(\delta_i + \kappa_i) - \varepsilon_i^2]^2}$$

which depends on the sign of Φ_j :

$$\Phi_j \begin{matrix} < \\ > \end{matrix} 0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{\partial(1 - \Phi_i\Phi_j)}{\partial\varepsilon_i} \begin{matrix} > \\ < \end{matrix} 0, \text{ and}$$

$\Sigma_i + \Phi_i\Phi_j$ which is positive if the slopes of the reaction curves have an equal sign and can be negative if they have opposite ones.

Hence, $\partial q_i^*/\partial\varepsilon_i$ is only unambiguously positive if Φ_i and Φ_j are both positive. The signs of all other combinations depend on the parameters.

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial q_j^*}{\partial\varepsilon_i} &= \Phi_j \frac{\gamma_i [(\beta_i + \theta_i)(\delta_i + \kappa_i) - \varepsilon_i^2] + 2\varepsilon_i[\alpha_i(\delta_i - \kappa_i) + \varepsilon_i\gamma_i]}{[(\beta_i + \theta_i)(\delta_i + \kappa_i) - \varepsilon_i^2]^2 (1 - \Phi_i\Phi_j)} + \\ &\frac{\Sigma_i\Phi_j^2}{(1 - \Phi_i\Phi_j)^2} \frac{2\varepsilon_i[(\beta_i + \theta_i)(\delta_i + \kappa_i) - \varepsilon_i^2] + 2\varepsilon_i[\varepsilon_i^2 - \beta_i(\delta_i + \kappa_i)]}{[(\beta_i + \theta_i)(\delta_i + \kappa_i) - \varepsilon_i^2]^2} \end{aligned}$$

The quotients in the numerator are both positive. Hence, if $\Phi_j > 0$, the sign is positive whereas it is ambiguous if $\Phi_j < 0$.

Taking possible conjectures into account demands supplementing $\partial q_i^*/\partial\varepsilon_i$ and $\partial q_j^*/\partial\varepsilon_i$. In the case of both countries evaluating its policy responds according to partial integration, $\partial q_i^*/\partial\varepsilon_i$ must be supplemented by

$$\begin{aligned} \text{suppl}(C2,i) &= T_j (1 + \Phi_i\Phi_j) \frac{\frac{\partial\Phi_i}{\partial\varepsilon_i} \frac{\varepsilon_i}{\delta_i + \kappa_i} + \frac{\Phi_i}{\delta_i + \kappa_i}}{(1 - \Phi_i\Phi_j)^2} + \\ &\frac{\partial(1 - \Phi_i\Phi_j)}{\partial\varepsilon_i} \frac{\Phi_i T_j \frac{\varepsilon_i}{\delta_i + \kappa_i} + T_i \frac{\varepsilon_j}{\delta_j + \kappa_j}}{(1 - \Phi_i\Phi_j)^2} \end{aligned}$$

whereas $\partial q_j^* / \partial \varepsilon_i$ must be supplemented by

$$\text{suppl}(C2,j) = \frac{\frac{T_j}{\delta_i + \kappa_i} (1 + \Phi_i \Phi_j) - T_j \frac{\varepsilon_i}{\delta_i + \kappa_i} \frac{\partial(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}{\partial \varepsilon_i}}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)^2}$$

Both supplements are ambiguous in sign and responsible for a total ambiguity. In the case of total integration, the $\text{suppl}(C2)$'s themselves must be modified. Straightforward calculations show that the $\text{suppl}(C3)$'s do not remove ambiguity because they neither add the first summand nor subtract the second one.

Table 1: Equilibrium Values for Different Conjecture Combinations

	C1(i)	C2(i)	C3(i)
C1(j)	$q_i^* = \frac{\Sigma_i + \Phi_i \Sigma_j}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$	$q_i^* = \frac{\Sigma_i + \Phi_i \Sigma_j - T_i \varepsilon_j / (\delta_j + \kappa_j)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$	$q_i^* = \frac{\Sigma_i + \Phi_i \Sigma_j - T_i \varepsilon_j (1 + \Phi_j) / (\delta_j + \kappa_j)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$
	$q_j^* = \frac{\Sigma_j + \Phi_j \Sigma_i}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$	$q_j^* = \frac{\Sigma_j + \Phi_j \Sigma_i - \Phi_j T_i \varepsilon_j / (\delta_j + \kappa_j)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$	$q_j^* = \frac{\Sigma_j + \Phi_j \Sigma_i - \Phi_j T_i \varepsilon_j (1 + \Phi_j) / (\delta_j + \kappa_j)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$
C2(j)	$q_i^* = \frac{\Sigma_i + \Phi_i \Sigma_j - \Phi_i T_j \varepsilon_i / (\delta_i + \kappa_i)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$	$q_i^* = \frac{\Sigma_i + \Phi_i \Sigma_j - \Phi_i T_j \varepsilon_i / (\delta_i + \kappa_i) - T_i \varepsilon_j / (\delta_j + \kappa_j)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$	$q_i^* = \frac{\Sigma_i + \Phi_i \Sigma_j - \Phi_i T_j \varepsilon_i / (\delta_i + \kappa_i) - T_i \varepsilon_j (1 + \Phi_j) / (\delta_j + \kappa_j)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$
	$q_j^* = \frac{\Sigma_j + \Phi_j \Sigma_i - T_j \varepsilon_i / (\delta_i + \kappa_i)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$	$q_j^* = \frac{\Sigma_j + \Phi_j \Sigma_i - \Phi_j T_i \varepsilon_j / (\delta_j + \kappa_j) - T_j \varepsilon_i / (\delta_i + \kappa_i)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$	$q_j^* = \frac{\Sigma_j + \Phi_j \Sigma_i - \Phi_j T_i \varepsilon_j (1 + \Phi_j) / (\delta_j + \kappa_j) - T_j \varepsilon_i / (\delta_i + \kappa_i)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$
C3(j)	$q_i^* = \frac{\Sigma_i + \Phi_i \Sigma_j - \Phi_i T_j \varepsilon_i (1 + \Phi_j) / (\delta_i + \kappa_i)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$	$q_i^* = \frac{\Sigma_i + \Phi_i \Sigma_j - \Phi_i T_j \varepsilon_i (1 + \Phi_j) / (\delta_i + \kappa_i) - T_i \varepsilon_j / (\delta_j + \kappa_j)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$	$q_i^* = \frac{\Sigma_i + \Phi_i \Sigma_j - \Phi_i T_j \varepsilon_i (1 + \Phi_j) / (\delta_i + \kappa_i) - T_i \varepsilon_j (1 + \Phi_j) / (\delta_j + \kappa_j)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$
	$q_j^* = \frac{\Sigma_j + \Phi_j \Sigma_i - T_j \varepsilon_i (1 + \Phi_j) / (\delta_i + \kappa_i)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$	$q_j^* = \frac{\Sigma_j + \Phi_j \Sigma_i - \Phi_j T_i \varepsilon_j / (\delta_j + \kappa_j) - T_j \varepsilon_i (1 + \Phi_j) / (\delta_i + \kappa_i)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$	$q_j^* = \frac{\Sigma_j + \Phi_j \Sigma_i - \Phi_j T_i \varepsilon_j (1 + \Phi_j) / (\delta_j + \kappa_j) - T_j \varepsilon_i (1 + \Phi_j) / (\delta_i + \kappa_i)}{(1 - \Phi_i \Phi_j)}$

Table 2: Differentiations with respect to ε_i in the case of C1/C1

	$\frac{\partial q_i^*}{\partial \varepsilon_i}$	$\frac{\partial q_j^*}{\partial \varepsilon_i}$
$\Phi_i, \Phi_j < 0$	ambiguous	ambiguous
$\Phi_i > 0, \Phi_j < 0$	ambiguous	ambiguous
$\Phi_i, \Phi_j > 0$	positive	positive
$\Phi_i < 0, \Phi_j > 0$	ambiguous	positive

Table 3: Different Scenarios of Corner Solutions

I. $ E_i^j < 0, E_j^j > 0$	II. $ E_i^j < 0, E_j^j < 0$
a) $U_i(x_i^c, 0) > U_i(q_i^c, 0)$ $x_i^c > 0, q_i = 0, x_j, q_j > 0$	a) $U_i(x_i^c, 0) > U_i(q_i^c, 0),$ $U_j(x_j^c, 0) > U_j(q_j^c, 0)$ $q_i = q_j = Q = 0$ $x_i, x_j > 0$
b ₁) $U_i(x_i^c, 0) < U_i(q_i^c, 0), q_j < q_j^{\#}$ $q_i > 0, x_i^c = 0, x_j, q_j > 0$	b) $U_i(x_i^c, 0) > U_i(q_i^c, 0),$ $U_j(x_j^c, 0) < U_j(q_j^c, 0)$ $q_i = 0 \Rightarrow x_j = 0, q_j > 0$
b ₂) $U_i(x_i^c, 0) < U_i(q_i^c, 0), q_j > q_j^{\#}$ $x_i^c > 0, q_i = 0, x_j, q_j > 0,$	c) $U_i(x_i^c, 0) < U_i(q_i^c, 0),$ $U_j(x_j^c, 0) < U_j(q_j^c, 0)$ all combinations possible

$q_j^{\#}$ denotes the critical reduction efforts of j. Reduction efforts of j which fall short of $q_j^{\#}$ imply a concentration on reductions and reduction efforts which surmount $q_j^{\#}$ imply a concentration on adaptation, causing a jump in the reaction curves.