Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150220
Authors: 
Ünver, M. Utku
Kesten, Onur
Kurino, Morimitsu
Hashimoto, Tadashi
Hirata, Daisuke
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 9 [Year:] 2014 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 253-277
Abstract: 
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism satisfying non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness and the only mechanism satisfying sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invariance or weak truncation robustness (where “sd” stands for first-order stochastic dominance).
Subjects: 
Random assignment
probabilistic serial
ordinal fairness
sd-efficiency
sd-envy-freeness
JEL: 
C71
C78
D71
D78
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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