Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150220 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2014 [Pages:] 253-277
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism satisfying non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness and the only mechanism satisfying sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invariance or weak truncation robustness (where “sd” stands for first-order stochastic dominance).
Schlagwörter: 
Random assignment
probabilistic serial
ordinal fairness
sd-efficiency
sd-envy-freeness
JEL: 
C71
C78
D71
D78
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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