Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129836
Authors: 
Miller, Luis
Montero, Maria
Vanberg, Christoph
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series 2015-24
Abstract: 
We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous `disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under unanimity rule, equilibrium payoffs are strictly increasing in disagreement values. Under all less-than-unanimity rules, expected payoffs are either decreasing or first increasing and then decreasing in disagreement values. We conduct experiments involving three players using majority and unanimity rule, finding support for these predictions.
Subjects: 
legislative bargaining
majority rule
unanimity rule
risk of breakdown
experiments
JEL: 
C78
C92
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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