Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/129836 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2015-24
Verlag: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous `disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under unanimity rule, equilibrium payoffs are strictly increasing in disagreement values. Under all less-than-unanimity rules, expected payoffs are either decreasing or first increasing and then decreasing in disagreement values. We conduct experiments involving three players using majority and unanimity rule, finding support for these predictions.
Schlagwörter: 
legislative bargaining
majority rule
unanimity rule
risk of breakdown
experiments
JEL: 
C78
C92
D71
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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