Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97470
Authors: 
Bouchard St-Amant, Pier-André
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper 1302
Abstract: 
Governments tend to fund universities based on the number of registered students and lump sum transfers. Such policy induces universities to compete for recruiting students, diverting money away from funds devoted to teaching. I show this degradation of quality increases with the degree to which universities compete for the same students. I suggest a policy that achieves the social optimum for any given level of funding. This policy shows that a university's funding rules should not be solely based on its enrollement, but also on the enrollment in competing universities.
Subjects: 
University
Funding Policies
Decentralized Decisions
JEL: 
H52
I23
I28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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