Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89740
Authors: 
Scharf, Kimberley Ann
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4492
Abstract: 
We describe a dynamic model of costly information sharing, where private information affecting collective-value actions is transmitted by social proximity. Individuals make voluntary contributions towards the provision of a pure public good, and information transmission about quality of provision is a necessary condition for collective provision to take place in a stationary equilibrium. We show that, unlike in the case of private goods, better informed individuals face positive incentives to incur a cost to share information with their neighbours; and that these incentives are stronger, and provision of the pure public good greater, the smaller are individuals' social neighbourhoods.
Subjects: 
private provision of public goods
information transmission
social learning
JEL: 
H10
L30
D60
D70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.