Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86357
Authors: 
van den Brink, René
Funaki, Yukihiko
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 04-136/1
Abstract: 
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A one-point solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss a class of solutions containing all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value, and the egalitarian solution. We characterize this class of solutions using a general standardness for two player games and reduced game consistency. Specific cases of these properties characterize specific solutions in this class.
Subjects: 
TU-game
Equal surplus sharing
CIS-value
ENSC-value
Egalitarian solution
Reduced Game Consistency
JEL: 
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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