Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/86357 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 04-136/1
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A one-point solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss a class of solutions containing all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value, and the egalitarian solution. We characterize this class of solutions using a general standardness for two player games and reduced game consistency. Specific cases of these properties characterize specific solutions in this class.
Schlagwörter: 
TU-game
Equal surplus sharing
CIS-value
ENSC-value
Egalitarian solution
Reduced Game Consistency
JEL: 
C71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
998.1 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.