Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76753
Authors: 
Bochet, Olivier
Gordon, Sidartha
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Universität Bern 09-02
Abstract: 
A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among interest groups. We characterize each of the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, hiding-proofness and strategy-proofness. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Alternatively, any such rule can be viewed as a collection of fixed-populations generalized peak-selection median rules (Moulin, 1980), that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.
Subjects: 
Multiple public facilities
Priority rules
Hierarchical rules
Object-population-monotonicity
Sovereignty
Anonymity
Strategy-proofness
Generalized median rules
Hiding-proofness
JEL: 
D60
D63
D70
D71
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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