Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75646
Authors: 
Bös, Dieter
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 244
Abstract: 
This paper models privatization as a cooperative game between the government, a trade union and the private shareholders. These players kno w that privatization increases the efficiency of a firm, but only the management of the firm knows the exact value of the relevant productivity-increasing parameter. This incomplete information changes many of the results which were attained in Bös (1991) in a full-information setting.
Subjects: 
Privatization
asymmetric information
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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