Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73386
Authors: 
Drometer, Marcus
Rincke, Johannes
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
BGPE Discussion Paper 37
Abstract: 
Measuring the effect of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition is compli- cated because the stringency of ballot access regulations cannot be treated as being exogenous to candidates' entry decisions. This paper exploits the 1968 U.S. Supreme Court decision to strike down Ohio's ballot access laws as a natural experiment to overcome the endogeneity problem. The evidence from difference-in-difference esti- mations suggests that the court decision and the accompanying sharp decrease in Ohio's petition requirements resulted in major parties facing a signifficant increase in competition from third party and independent candidates.
Subjects: 
Ballot access
petition requirements
electoral competition
natural experiment
JEL: 
D72
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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