Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73386 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
BGPE Discussion Paper No. 37
Verlag: 
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE), Nürnberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Measuring the effect of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition is compli- cated because the stringency of ballot access regulations cannot be treated as being exogenous to candidates' entry decisions. This paper exploits the 1968 U.S. Supreme Court decision to strike down Ohio's ballot access laws as a natural experiment to overcome the endogeneity problem. The evidence from difference-in-difference esti- mations suggests that the court decision and the accompanying sharp decrease in Ohio's petition requirements resulted in major parties facing a signifficant increase in competition from third party and independent candidates.
Schlagwörter: 
Ballot access
petition requirements
electoral competition
natural experiment
JEL: 
D72
D78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
282.47 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.