Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/726 
Year of Publication: 
1985
Citation: 
[Publisher:] Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) [Place:] Kiel [Year:] 1985
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 223
Publisher: 
Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW), Kiel
Abstract: 
One of the least settled issues in US offshore oil policy is the "best" scheme to capture resource rents arising from hydrocarbon production. This paper analyses the impact of alternative bidding systems on the intertemporal production path and on the firm's investment decision. It concludes that with the exception of the pure profit share system all other pure or mixed bidding systems are likely to have a distortive effect on production and, thus, eventually lead to a dissipation of economic rent. Further, no leasing system authorised by current public law is found to be neutral regarding investment decisions.
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Document Version: 
Digitized Version

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