Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72012
Authors: 
Chan, Jimmy
Suen, Wing
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics 497
Abstract: 
We present a model in which the media provide voters with information that is tainted by their own preferences, and derive an equilibrium in which media endorsements influence voting behavior. Competition for media endorsement causes political parties to adopt more centrist policies, which benefits all voters. Mass media which are more sensitive to changes in policies and which are less biased lead to greater policy convergence toward the median voter's ideal point. The presence of multiple media outlets also helps promote electoral competition.
Subjects: 
media bias
cheap talk
policy convergence
JEL: 
D72
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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