Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/72012 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 497
Verlag: 
The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics, Baltimore, MD
Zusammenfassung: 
We present a model in which the media provide voters with information that is tainted by their own preferences, and derive an equilibrium in which media endorsements influence voting behavior. Competition for media endorsement causes political parties to adopt more centrist policies, which benefits all voters. Mass media which are more sensitive to changes in policies and which are less biased lead to greater policy convergence toward the median voter's ideal point. The presence of multiple media outlets also helps promote electoral competition.
Schlagwörter: 
media bias
cheap talk
policy convergence
JEL: 
D72
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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