Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69589
Authors: 
Nitzan, Shmuel
Ueda, Kaoru
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper: Public Choice 4096
Abstract: 
Collective contests are examined permitting heterogeneity of stakes within every competing group. Our first concern is whether unequal distribution of stakes in a group can enhance its win probability. Our second concern is whether a large stake in a group can be individually disadvantageous. We find that if a contest is sufficiently hard for a group, the answers to these questions are positive under plausible conditions. In such situations, monopoly of the private stake is most effective in enhancing the group's performance. Ironically, in the same cases, the welfare of many group members would be negatively related to the size of their individual stake.
Subjects: 
collective contest
intra-group heterogeneity
elasticity of marginal effort costs
unequal stakes and group performance
military alliance
exploitation of the large
JEL: 
D70
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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