Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69511
Authors: 
Lai, Chung-hui
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Discussion Papers 2013-14
Abstract: 
In this paper, the author shows how the introduction of a bargaining game structure into a standard R&D endogenous growth model can be a potential source of local indeterminacy. He also shows that on a high-growth path, the government, by directly engaging in R&D activities and using R&D subsidies, may not enhance economic growth. On a low-growth path, the government, by directly engaging in R&D activities and using R&D subsidies, may enhance economic growth.
Subjects: 
government R&D
innovation
endogenous growth
bargaining
indeterminacy
JEL: 
O30
O41
L00
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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