Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68079
Authors: 
García-Alonso, María del Carmen
Levine, Paul
Morga, Antonia
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Department of Economics Discussion Paper, University of Kent 04,02
Abstract: 
We analyse the role played by Export Credit Guarantees (ECGs) to encourage exports to developing countries. The existence of moral hazard on the side of the firm is introduced. We show that the inability of the exporter's government to verify the actual quality of the product will limit its ability to encourage trade through ECGs, once the coverage provided goes beyond a certain threshold. This result provides a rationale behind the limited coverage on ECGs.
Subjects: 
export credit guarantees
offsets
moral hazard
JEL: 
G12
H56
L10
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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