Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/68079 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 04,02
Verlag: 
University of Kent, Department of Economics, Canterbury
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyse the role played by Export Credit Guarantees (ECGs) to encourage exports to developing countries. The existence of moral hazard on the side of the firm is introduced. We show that the inability of the exporter's government to verify the actual quality of the product will limit its ability to encourage trade through ECGs, once the coverage provided goes beyond a certain threshold. This result provides a rationale behind the limited coverage on ECGs.
Schlagwörter: 
export credit guarantees
offsets
moral hazard
JEL: 
G12
H56
L10
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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