Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68065
Authors: 
Bergland, Harald
Clark, Derek J.
Pedersen, Pål Andreas
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Department of Economics Discussion Paper, University of Kent 01,06
Abstract: 
The paper deals with rent-seeking behaviour among agents competing for future shares of a common renewable natural resource. Rent-seeking might become profitable when the agents expect that the distribution of the natural resource in future periods will be dependent on the agents' extraction of the resource in the past, even though high exploitation might reduce the stock that future individual quotas will be based upon. Whether aggressive rent-seeking behaviour by one agent will encourage other agents to rent-seek more, however, is generally found to be ambiguous.
Subjects: 
Rent-seeking
quota regulation
renewable resources
JEL: 
Q2
D7
C7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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