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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 01,06
Verlag: 
University of Kent, Department of Economics, Canterbury
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper deals with rent-seeking behaviour among agents competing for future shares of a common renewable natural resource. Rent-seeking might become profitable when the agents expect that the distribution of the natural resource in future periods will be dependent on the agents' extraction of the resource in the past, even though high exploitation might reduce the stock that future individual quotas will be based upon. Whether aggressive rent-seeking behaviour by one agent will encourage other agents to rent-seek more, however, is generally found to be ambiguous.
Schlagwörter: 
Rent-seeking
quota regulation
renewable resources
JEL: 
Q2
D7
C7
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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