Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67975
Authors: 
Montero, Maria
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper, The University of Nottingham 2007-12
Abstract: 
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper shows that the paradox has theoretically occurred in the EU using the leading model of legislative bargaining. Furthermore, it is possible for a majority of members to be in favor of enlargement, even if voters are bargaining over a fixed budget.
Subjects: 
legislative bargaining
weighted voting
power measures
EU enlargement
paradox of new members
JEL: 
C71
C72
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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