Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/67975 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2007-12
Verlag: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Zusammenfassung: 
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper shows that the paradox has theoretically occurred in the EU using the leading model of legislative bargaining. Furthermore, it is possible for a majority of members to be in favor of enlargement, even if voters are bargaining over a fixed budget.
Schlagwörter: 
legislative bargaining
weighted voting
power measures
EU enlargement
paradox of new members
JEL: 
C71
C72
C78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
200.12 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.