Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Stähler, Frank
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 759
In a recent paper, Muthoo (1995) discusses whether the Rubinstein solution carries over on repeated bargaining situations. He concludes that stationary equilibria for such a repeated bargaining game do not imply the Rubinstein solution and that several non-stationary equilibria may exist. This paper demonstrates that the Rubinstein solution applies not only to unique bargaining problems but to repeated bargaining problems as well. It demonstrates that stationarity holds also in Muthoo's model, and it shows that a certain result of Muthoo which makes the split of bargaining gains independent of the discount factors is no relevant case as the discounted sum of each agent's utility is infinite. The paper introduces an alternative approach which takes into account that offers may cover also future realizations by employing future contracts. It shows that the agreement depends crucially on the enforceability of contracts if bargaining behavior fulfils a rationality condition.
Strategic bargaining
repeated games
rational bargaining behavior
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
748.54 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.