Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47083
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dc.contributor.authorRauscher, Michaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-30T15:11:52Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-30T15:11:52Z-
dc.date.issued1996en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47083-
dc.description.abstractIt has been argued in the literature that, interjurisdictional competition forces the public sector to increase its efficiency and thus helps to tame Leviathan governments. The paper addresses this hypothesis by means of a simple taxcompetition model with a Leviathan state. It is seen that the effects of increased factor mobility on the efficiency of the public sector are ambiguous. A calibration of the model shows that a reduction in public-sector efficiency is possible for parameter constellations which are not unrealistic.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKiel Working Paper |x732en_US
dc.subject.jelF20en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH40en_US
dc.subject.jelH73en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentlicher Sektoren_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwFaktormobilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwInstitutionalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleInterjurisdictional competition and the efficiency of the public sector: The triumph of the market over the state?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:732-
dc.identifier.printppn257642242en_US

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