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Erscheinungsjahr: 
1984
Quellenangabe: 
[Publisher:] Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) [Place:] Kiel [Year:] 1984
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 217
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
It is now generally recognized that special interest group influence on economic decision making is not in theory a phenomenon restricted to democratic capitalism. Governments which have attained power by non-democratic means must eventually seek legitimacy, either by populist appeals to the masses or by cultivating the support of important sectors (e.g. Lovell (1975)). They may therefore be no less immune to interest group lobbying than governments which face electoral scrutiny. Likewise, it has been argued that the incentive for interest groups to exert political pressure is in fact greater under socialism than under capitalism (e.g. Becker (1983)). The purpose of this paper is to present evidence on the role of special interest groups in economic policy making in the Republic of Korea (South Korea), a country which differs from a western capitalist democracy in at least one important respect.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Dokumentversion: 
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