Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45347
Autoren: 
Gu, Yiquan
Hehenkamp, Burkhard
Datum: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Ruhr Economic Papers No. 219
Zusammenfassung: 
Including the entry decision in a Bertrand model with imperfectly informed consumers, we introduce a trade-off at the level of social welfare. On the one hand, market transparency is benefi cial when the number of firms is exogenously given. On the other, a higher degree of market transparency implies lower profits and hence makes it less attractive to enter the market in the first place. It turns out that the second effect dominates: too much market transparency has a detrimental effect on consumer surplus and on social welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
market transparency
endogenous entry
homogenous products
JEL: 
D43
L13
L15
ISBN: 
978-3-86788-251-4
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
238.65 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.