Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/4108
Authors: 
Oskamp, Frank
Snower, Dennis J.
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 1389
Abstract: 
This paper examines the interactions between employment and training policies. Their effectiveness in stimulating income may be interdependent for various important reasons. For example, the more employment policies stimulate the employment rate, the greater the length of time over which workers use the human capital generated by training policies. Moreover, the greater the government expenditures on employment and training subsidies, the higher the taxes required to finance these expenditures and these higher taxes reduce aggregate income. On account of such effects, employment and training policies may be complementary or substitutable with respect to aggregate income. To analyze these interactions, we construct a simple, dynamic model of hiring decisions, derived from microfoundations. The model is calibrated with German data. Surprisingly, the simulation shows that, for reasonable parameter values, the complementarities are weak or absent. The analysis provides a methodology for examining policy interactions which may be useful well beyond the bounds of employment and training policies.
Subjects: 
Hiring subsidies
Training subsidies
Vocational training
Employment
Unemployment
Complementarities
JEL: 
J68
J24
J23
J64
J21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
408.91 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.