Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/4066
Authors: 
Neugebauer, Tibor
Perote, Javier
Schmidt, Ulrich
Loos, Malte
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 1376
Abstract: 
In the recent literature, several hypotheses have been put forward in order to explain the decline of contributions in repeated public good games. We present results of an experiment which allows to evaluate these hypotheses. The main characteristics of our experimental design are a variation of information feedback and an elicitation of individual beliefs about others' contributions. Altogether, our data support the hypothesis of conditional cooperation with a selfish bias.
Subjects: 
Information feedback
Public goods
Voluntary contributions
Conditional cooperation
Experimental economics
JEL: 
C72
C92
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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