Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39654
Authors: 
Schmidt, Ulrich
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 1646
Abstract: 
This note presents an experimental study of the random lottery incentive mechanism. In the baseline treatment we observe risk behavior in a given choice problem. We show that by integrating a second, asymmetrically dominated choice problem in a random incentive mechanism risk behavior can be manipulated systematically. This implies that the isolation hypothesis is violated the random incentive mechanism does not elicit true preferences.
Subjects: 
Random incentive mechanism
isolation
asymmetrically dominated alternatives
JEL: 
C91
D81
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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