Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338275 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10585
Version Description: 
This Version: October 2025
Publisher: 
Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
We introduce discontinuous Markovian strategies for differential games. The best response correspondence uniquely maps almost all profiles of opponents' strategies back to the strategy space. We thus make Markov-perfect equilibria (MPE) in a wide class of differential games well-behaved, resolving a long-standing open problem. We provide a readily applicable necessary and sufficient condition for best responses and MPE. We demonstrate our methods in a canonical model of non-cooperative mitigation of climate change. Our approach provides novel, economically important results: we obtain the entire set of symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibria, and demonstrate that the best equilibria can yield a major welfare improvement over the equilibrium which previous literature has focused on. International climate negotiations should be seen as being about coordination on good equilibria, rather than about bargaining over the limited surplus available in a dynamic prisoner's dilemma.
Subjects: 
differential games
Markov-perfect Nash equilibria
dynamic public investment
climate policy
JEL: 
C72
C73
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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