Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/333782 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law [ISSN:] 2399-5548 [Volume:] 32 [Issue:] 5-6 [Publisher:] Sage [Place:] Thousand Oaks, CA [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 552-579
Publisher: 
Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA
Abstract: 
This article develops a behavioural approach to the principle of judicial independence. It argues that implementing the proposed approach can help to safeguard judicial independence more effectively. It addresses the question of what a behaviour-related concept of judicial independence should look like and what state obligations arise from this. It takes into account empirical findings which were not yet available when the legal principle was initially shaped by constitutional and regional human rights jurisprudence. First, the article outlines certain basic premises of a behavioural concept of judicial independence. It then takes a closer look at the factors that determine the behaviour of judges and of such third actors that might attempt to unduly influence judges. In addition, the article engages with the objective of the principle of judicial independence to inspire trust in the judiciary and outlines potential behavioural effects relevant for this trust dimension. Finally, it discusses whether certain behavioural effects that can shape judicial decision-making should be regarded as normatively undesirable in the context of judicial independence.
Subjects: 
Judicial independence
behavioural concept
psychological factors
observer perspective
social perspectives
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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