Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/327696 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 12086
Publisher: 
Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
Are sanctions bypassed by hiding money offshore? Using bilateral data on bank deposits, we compare how offshore deposits from sanctioned versus non-sanctioned countries develop after the U.S. and the EU impose financial sanctions. Sanctions targeting individuals increase offshore deposits, as (potential) targets attempt to hide their funds. Broader financial sanctions reduce offshore (and other foreign) deposits, as money is repatriated. A synthetic control case study of Russia following the annexation of Crimea confirms our main findings, showing a 15% post-sanction increase in offshore deposits. These findings highlight the limits of symbolic sanctions and the need for secondary sanctions and financial surveillance.
Subjects: 
sanctions
tax havens
illicit financial flows
JEL: 
F51
H12
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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