Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/327696 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 12086
Verlag: 
Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Are sanctions bypassed by hiding money offshore? Using bilateral data on bank deposits, we compare how offshore deposits from sanctioned versus non-sanctioned countries develop after the U.S. and the EU impose financial sanctions. Sanctions targeting individuals increase offshore deposits, as (potential) targets attempt to hide their funds. Broader financial sanctions reduce offshore (and other foreign) deposits, as money is repatriated. A synthetic control case study of Russia following the annexation of Crimea confirms our main findings, showing a 15% post-sanction increase in offshore deposits. These findings highlight the limits of symbolic sanctions and the need for secondary sanctions and financial surveillance.
Schlagwörter: 
sanctions
tax havens
illicit financial flows
JEL: 
F51
H12
K42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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