Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/325479 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences No. 01-2025
Publisher: 
Universität Hohenheim, Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Stuttgart
Abstract: 
We develop a model that incorporates task-based production into a matching model with intrafirm wage bargaining. Unlike in existing task-based models, the representative firm derives the optimal task allocation as a function of capital and labor, rather than relative factor prices. Embedding this mechanism in a model with strategic employment choice, we show how the properties of task-level technology affect the extent of over
Subjects: 
task approach
search and matching
Stole-Zwiebel bargaining
overhiring
wage bargaining
elasticity of complementarity
JEL: 
J23
D24
E23
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.