Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324961 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
GLO Discussion Paper No. 1661
Publisher: 
Global Labor Organization (GLO), Essen
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the mechanisms by which Stoic ethics can produce coordination. We study how agents satisfying the Stoic discipline of desires (that is, one should wish for nothing that is out of control, including other players'acts) behave in 2-player simultaneous symmetric coordination games. It is shown that the extent to which the Stoic discipline of desires produces coordination depends on the particular way in which this is translated into the language of microeconomics. Under the I1 account of the Stoic discipline of desires (requiring indifference between outcomes that differ only on other players'acts), it is the case either that coordination is achieved or that coordination is valueless. Hence adopting the I1 account suffices to coordinate agents, without any need for a shared idea of the 'Common Good'. On the contrary, the I2 account of the Stoic discipline of desires (requiring indifference between outcomes that are the best given other players'acts) does not always suffice to coordinate agents.
Subjects: 
Stoicism
games
coordination
rationality
discipline of desires
JEL: 
C70
D01
D60
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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