Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/316884 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11770
Verlag: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
In a union of states with partial mobility of households and firms we analyze the setting of minimum wages against the background of unemployment insurance. We find that unemployment insurance is always efficiently organized by decentral decisions. In contrast, for symmetric states only the central setting of minimum wages is efficient. Decentralized minimum wages can be shown to be generically inefficient because the decision makers either externalize the cost of unemployment via the pooled insurance budget or exploit migrational externalities. Only with full mobility, the opposing migration effects outweigh the pooling effect. Our results suggest that contrary to insurance which can be efficiently organized decentrally, a pure redistribution like minimum wages should be centralized in a state union.
Schlagwörter: 
minimum wage
unemployment insurance
centralization
international migration
common pool problem.
JEL: 
E24
F22
H77
J38
J65
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.