Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/316855 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11741
Verlag: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
How does the media bias the news? And in particular, how much does it cost owners to ensure that journalists comply with their stance? We compile a unique dataset of journalists and guests appearing on French television and radio shows between 2002 and 2020 to quantify the role played by journalist selection and compliance in political coverage. First, we leverage the movements of thousands of journalists between media outlets, and estimate a model in which the share of coverage for each political group is determined both by journalist and outlet components. We find that outlet-level decisions account for three-fourths of the differences in political coverage; in contrast, journalists' personal editorial preferences play only a minor role. Second, we examine how journalists respond to a major takeover-induced editorial change. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we show that while many journalists left in response to the shock, those who stayed largely adapted to the new editorial direction. Notably, exploiting unique data on journalist salaries, we show that this compliance came at nearly no cost for the new owner, reflecting journalists' low bargaining power in an industry in crisis.
Schlagwörter: 
media bias
slant
journalists
media ownership
media concentration
pluralism
media capture
news organizations
wage compensation
monopsony power
JEL: 
L15
L82
J40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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