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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11711
Verlag: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a market in which a platform hosts third-party monopolistic complementors. Users are segmented into single-use and multi-use consumers, and services exhibit network externalities. In the agency model, the presence of multi-use consumers leads complementors to set inefficiently high prices, reducing demand and the platform's profits. Platform entry can resolve these pricing inefficiencies by targeting multi-use consumers with a bundled offering, but it then fragments the market, diminishing network benefits for consumers. We find that the platform opts to enter only when it has committed to a low commission fee, and network benefits are modest. Integration with a complementor reduces prices for consumers and enhances network benefits, thereby improving consumer welfare, but the pricing inefficiency is only partially mitigated.
Schlagwörter: 
platform
network externalities
platform strategy
hybrid business model
JEL: 
L22
L86
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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