Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305507 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11265
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
When a counter-proposal is made to an initiative to change the Swiss constitution, the citizenry makes three binary majority choices: the initiative versus the status quo, the initiative versus the counter-proposal, and the status quo versus the counterproposal as a tie-breaker. If there is a cycle, the alternative that beats the status-quo wins. This system invites strategic voting, as exemplified by the 2010 case of the “Ausschaffungsinitiative”. We suggest to break cycles differently by choosing the middle alternative in case of a cycle, which will normally be the counter-proposal. More precisely, we show that there always exists a strong Nash equilibrium in which all citizens vote sincerely. Moreover, the outcome of all alternative strong equilibria with strategic voting is the same as if everybody votes sincerely. We also show that other common cycle-breaker rules cannot achieve the same result.
Subjects: 
Swiss democracy
three-way referendum
Condorcet Winner
manipulation
information sharing
initiative
JEL: 
C72
D70
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.