Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284273 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2022-15
Publisher: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Abstract: 
We consider the class of linear voluntary contribution games under the general assumption of heterogeneous endowments. In this context, we assess the performance of the Galbraith Mechanism (GM) relative to a fixed equal sharing allocation in both theory and experiments. Three main empirical results emerge. First, the GM raises average contributions significantly above those under an equal-shares allocation. Second, the GM simultaneously reduces income inequality as it improves efficiency. Third, a player's contribution and allocation behaviour is sensitive to her position in the endowment distribution. In all their decision-making, agents consistently place greater emphasis on contribution levels when they are rich, and on contribution ratios (contributions relative to endowments) when they are poor.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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