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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
School of Economics Discussion Papers No. 2109
Verlag: 
University of Kent, School of Economics, Canterbury
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we show that a concept of aggregation can hold in large network games with linear best replies. Breaking up large networks into smaller subnetworks, which can be replaced by representative players, leads to a coarse-grained description of strategic interactions. This method of summarizing complex strategic interactions by simple ones can be applied to compute all Nash equilibria for the special network structure of cograph. A key finding is that a stable Nash equilibrium of the large network game can be decomposed into a collection of Nash equilibria of subnetwork games. Thereby, we establish a systematic relationship between player's position in a subnetwork and his equilibrium action in the large network game.
Schlagwörter: 
aggregation
modular decomposition
network games
public goods
stability
JEL: 
C72
D31
D85
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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