Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265030 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Southern Economic Journal [ISSN:] 2325-8012 [Volume:] 89 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] John Wiley & Sons, Inc. [Place:] Hoboken, USA [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 238-270
Publisher: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, USA
Abstract: 
The so‐called excess‐entry theorem establishes conditions guaranteeing that more firms enter a homogeneous Cournot‐oligopoly in equilibrium than a benevolent government prefers. We generalize the approach and analyze the behavior of a competition authority, which attaches different weights to the firms' and consumers' payoffs, with welfare‐maximization constituting a special case. The greater the importance of consumers, the less likely entry restrictions are, whereas a greater relevance of firms makes a monopoly more probable. The nature of entry restrictions also depends on the competition authority's instruments. The essential insights continue to apply if firms are heterogeneous concerning costs and the timing of output choices.
Subjects: 
competition authority
Cournot‐oligopoly
excessive entry
monopoly
partisan objective
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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