Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26307 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2262
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes.
JEL: 
D4
D43
H21
H22
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size
246.99 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.