Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26307
Authors: 
Kind, Hans Jarle
Koethenbuerger, Marko
Schjelderup, Guttorm
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2262
Abstract: 
This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes.
JEL: 
D4
D43
H21
H22
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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