Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253496 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 197-234
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
In a general model of trading networks with bilateral contracts, we propose a suitably adapted chain stability concept that plays the same role as pairwise stability in two-sided settings. We show that chain stability is equivalent to stability if all agents' preferences are jointly fully substitutable and satisfy the Laws of Aggregate Supply and Demand. In the special case of trading networks with transferable utility, an outcome is consistent with competitive equilibrium if and only if it is chain stable.
Subjects: 
Matching
trading networks
chain stability
stability
competitive equilibria
full substitutability
Laws of Aggregate Supply and Demand
JEL: 
C78
D85
L14
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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