Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/251889 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Political Economy [ISSN:] 1537-534X [Volume:] 130 [Issue:] 6 [Publisher:] University of Chicago Press [Place:] Chicago, IL [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] --
Publisher: 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL
Abstract: 
We document quasi-experimental evidence against the common assumption in the matching literature that agents have full information on their own preferences. In Germany's university admissions, the first stages of the Gale-Shapley algorithm are implemented in real time, allowing for multiple offers per student. We demonstrate that nonexploding early offers are accepted more often than later offers, despite not being more desirable. These results, together with survey evidence and a theoretical model, are consistent with students' costly discovery of preferences. A novel dynamic multioffer mechanism that batches early offers improves matching efficiency by informing students of offer availability before preference discovery.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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