Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/242853 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers No. 21-02
Publisher: 
University of Bern, Department of Economics, Bern
Abstract: 
I show that there exists a mapping between a class of information design games with multiple senders and a class of all-pay auctions. I fully characterize this mapping and show how to use it to find equilibria in the information design game. Such an approach could be applied to establish mappings between other classes of information design games, on the one hand, and contests, on the other.
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Working Paper

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