Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/241262 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economic Inquiry [ISSN:] 1465-7295 [Volume:] 59 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [Place:] Boston, USA [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 996-1007
Publisher: 
Wiley Periodicals, Inc., Boston, USA
Abstract: 
How decision makers respond to behavioral and traditional interventions might depend on their and the regulator's attributes. This online experiment investigates the effect of defaults, recommendations, and mandatory minimum contributions accompanied by regulator information on the private provision of climate protection, accounting for intrinsic motivation. Findings show that all interventions increase the propensity of individuals to choose the focal value. There is no evidence that recommendations and defaults change average contributions. We report a negative interaction of the default with intrinsic motivation. Expert or political regulator information decreases intervention effectiveness. The study improves our understanding of behavioral public policy instruments.
Subjects: 
climate protection
default
experiment
motivation crowding
nudge
public good
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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